Turing computation over a non-linguistic domain presupposes a notation for the domain. Accordingly, computability theory studies notations for various non-linguistic domains.
formalism, then the Gap Argument shows that we must introduce a semantic interpretation over One might try to avoid the Gap Argument by characterizing numerical computability through notions defined directly over the natural numbers, rather than linguistic intermediaries.
To illustrate, say that a numerical function is Kleene-computable iff we can obtain it from the primitive recursive functions through function composition and application of the minimization operator . Kleene's Normal Form Theorem entails that a function is partial recursive iff it is Kleene-computable. We define Kleene-computability without mentioning symbol manipulation, so the Gap Argument does not apply.
However, few commentators would recommend Kleene-computability as a satisfactory foundation for computability theory. As Gödel [1934 Gödel [ /1986 maintained, Turing analyzes not just computability but computation itself. Turing thereby connects formal 1 Philosophers and computability theorists typically assume that 's elements are individuated non-semantically, through factors such as geometric shape. Under this assumption, the string language taken on its own is equally compatible with any arbitrary semantic interpretation d. In [Rescorla, forthcoming] , I question whether the Turing formalism mandates an alphabet  whose elements are individuated non-semantically. For present purposes, I set these issues aside. I assume an alphabet  whose elements are individuated non-semantically.
mathematical theorizing with our pre-theoretic conception of computation. In contrast, a characterization through Kleene-computability does not even purport to analyze computation.
That is why Turing's analysis supports Church's thesis while an analysis citing Kleene- computability does not. If we follow Turing by analyzing computation as symbol manipulation, then the Gap Argument gains a foothold.
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Classical recursion theory extends Turing computability beyond the natural numbers to other countable non-linguistic domains: integers; rational numbers; finite sets of natural numbers; and so on. In each case, the Gap Argument shows that we must introduce a semantic mapping from the string language to the desired domain.
A particularly important example: computation over the partial recursive functions themselves. Through Gödelization, we can code Turing machine programs using strings drawn from *. We then map each string to the partial recursive function computed by the corresponding program. This procedure yields a canonical total function : *  , where is the set of partial recursive string-theoretic functions : *  *.
3 Abbreviate (x) as  x . Thus,  x is the partial recursive function named by index x. Having introduced canonical names for partial recursive functions, we can study mechanical procedures that take those functions as inputs or outputs. For example, Turing proved the existence of a 'Universal Turing Machine' (UTM) that mimics any partial recursive function when provided with a name for that function:
Enumeration (or UTM) theorem: There exists a partial recursive function U: *×*  * such that, for all x, y*, U(x, y) =  x (y).
2 The mathematical literature offers various alternative analyses of numerical computability, such as the lambda calculus [Church, 1936] or the equation calculus [Kleene, 1936] . Famously, all these alternative analyses are extensionally equivalent. Most analyses, although not all, assign a crucial role to symbol manipulation. 3 Computability theorists typically index partial recursive functions by numbers, not strings. For mathematical purposes, the difference does not matter. From a philosophical perspective, it is more fitting to use strings as indices [Rogers, 1987, p. 28] . Ultimately, we must represent partial recursive functions by using concrete names. Using numbers as indices only postpones an inevitable appeal to concrete names and their representational properties.
Kleene proved that one can computably incorporate arguments of partial recursive functions into indices for partial recursive functions:
Parameterization (or s-m-n) theorem:
There exists a partial recursive function s: *×*  * such that, for all x, y, z *,  x (y, z) =  s(x, y) (z).
Indexing of partial recursive functions underlies most of recursion theory's basic results: Rice's theorem; the Kleene recursion theorem; and so on. 4 In general, suppose we want to model Turing computations that take inputs drawn from countable domain X and yield outputs drawn from countable domain Y. Suppose that neither X nor Y contains strings drawn from a finite alphabet of symbols. Then we must introduce notations for X and Y. For present purposes, we construe notations as surjective functions d:
* X and e: * Y. We say that f: X  Y is computable relative to d and e iff there is a partial recursive : *  * such that f(d(x)) = e((x)), for all x*. Informally,  converts a d-name for each xdom(f) into an e-name for f(x).
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Our definitions reflect a crucial relativity inherent to Turing-computation over a nonlinguistic domain:
Relativity: Turing computation over non-linguistic domains is relative to a notation. The same Turing machine T computes different non-linguistic functions, depending upon the semantic interpretation of strings manipulated by the Turing machine.
To illustrate, consider a machine T that doubles the number of stroke marks on the tape, and let m be a string of m strokes. If m denotes the number m, then T computes the function f(n) = 2n. If m denotes the number m-1, then T computes g(n) = 2n + 1. Lacking a determinate interpretation of strings, we cannot treat a Turing machine as computing a determinate function over the natural numbers. Similarly, consider any UTM. Relative to our canonical indexing , the UTM computes the function : ×*  * that carries  x  and y* to  x (y), assuming  x (y) is
defined. Yet the UTM does not compute  relative to a suitably different notation for . As these examples illustrate, a change in notation typically alters the non-linguistic function computed by a Turing machine. Lacking a determinate semantic interpretation of strings, a Turing machine does not compute a determinate function over a non-linguistic domain.
Admissible versus deviant notations
There exist 'deviant' notations relative to which intuitively non-computable functions become
Turing-computable [Copeland and Proudfoot, 2010; Montague, 1960; Shapiro, 1982] . In [Rescorla, 2007] Recursion theory textbooks invariably ignore deviant notations for . They select a single notation (such as d binary ) and develop recursion theory relative to that privileged notation. For many purposes, this procedure is entirely legitimate. However, if we desire a general theory of computation over natural numbers, then the procedure seems arbitrary and unsatisfying.
Numerical computation can proceed relative to diverse reasonable notations. There is no clear basis for privileging one specific notation as fundamental [Rescorla, 2007] Deviant semantic interpretations arise whenever we consider Turing computation over a non-linguistic countably infinite domain X:
Deviancy: There exist deviant semantic interpretations from strings to X. Relative to a deviant notation, Turing machines can 'compute' functions over X that are intuitively uncomputable.
To illustrate, consider the Totality Problem: is there a uniform mechanical procedure that decides whether a partial recursive function is total? One can prove that there is no Turing machine T such that:
Given input x, T outputs 1 if  x is total and 0 if  x is not total, where  is our canonical indexing of . Based on this theorem, we conclude that the Totality Problem is undecidable. However, one can easily construct a notation η: * such that, for some Turing machine T:
Given input x, T outputs 1 if η x is total and 0 if η x is not total.
Should we conclude that the Totality Problem is decidable after all? Of course not, because the requisite notation η is highly deviant. Of course, we do not have uncountably many intuitive concepts of computability over a domain.
An intuitive notion of computability arises only when the relevant notations are 'admissible' rather than 'deviant.' A theory of Turing computation over any non-linguistic countably infinite domain must address the distinction between admissible and deviant notations for the domain. Unfortunately, analyzing this distinction in satisfying terms is not so easy.
To illustrate, suppose one says that a notation is admissible iff there is an effective procedure that maps strings into values denoted by strings. On this analysis, admissibility requires a computation that takes strings drawn from * and yields appropriate denotations drawn from X. Assuming that X is a non-linguistic domain, we need a notation to represent its elements. Which notations for X may we use when computing denotations of strings? Not just any notation will do. For example, many deviant notations will be incorrectly ruled admissible if we allow computations relative to d A . But why should we disallow computations relative to d A ?
Well, because d A itself is deviant. Unfortunately, that answer presupposes the distinction between admissible and deviant notations. In other words, suppose we say:
d: *  X is admissible iff there is an admissible notation e: *  X and a Turing machine T such that T carries each d-name to a co-referring e-name.
Then we assume that we have already demarcated the admissible notations for X, which renders our procedure circular.
To avoid circularity, we can demand that some effective procedure carry strings to denoted values as represented by a fixed privileged notation. More precisely:
(1) d: *  X is admissible iff there is a Turing machine T that carries each d-name to a co-
where d X : *  X is some fixed privileged notation for X. We may rephrase (1) as follows:
For example, we might explicate admissibility over the natural numbers by taking d binary as our privileged notation:
According to (3), a numerical notation is admissible just in case we can computably translate it into binary notation. (3) seems implicit in the practice of recursion theory, which dismisses without consideration all numerical notations not reducible to d binary . Similarly, we might explicate admissibility over the partial recursive functions by taking the canonical indexing  as our privileged notation:
According to (4),  is admissible just in case we can computably translate a -name for a partial recursive function into a Turing machine program that computes the function.
(2) requires that we can computably translate an admissible notation into some fixed privileged notation. A more demanding definition requires that we can also computably translate back from the privileged notation:
Applying this more demanding definition to the natural numbers yields:
(3) and (6) are extensionally equivalent,
Applying the more demanding definition to the partial recursive functions yields:
which requires that one can computably recover a -name for a partial recursive function from a Turing machine program that computes the function. (4) and (7) are not extensionally equivalent, because there are notations  such that    and (  ). One can show that the Parameterization theorem fails for any such , i.e. the theorem fails if we substitute  for  [Rogers, 1987, pp. 41-42] . Since the Parameterization theorem is needed for developing a fruitful recursion theory,  does not yield a useful notion of computation over . Accordingly, Rogers [1987, p. 41] advocates (7) rather (4) as the proper definition of admissibility for partial recursive functions (although he uses the phrase 'acceptable' rather than 'admissible').
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Setting aside the differences between (2) and (5), each definition faces the same fundamental worry: it ties admissibility to a privileged notation arbitrarily chosen from among many equally worthy competitors [Rescorla, 2012] . Consider the special case of (3 Some readers may insist that    suffices for admissibility. If this verdict were correct, then it would be an example of Multiplicity (discussed in Section 2.3), so it would actually strengthen my overall argument. However, I find the verdict implausible. Rogers [1987, p. 42 ] adduces a notation  such that    and (  ) with the following property: there is a Turing machine that responds to input x with output 1 if  x (0) is defined and output 0 if  x (0) is undefined. In other words, we can 'decide' relative to  whether a given partial recursive function is defined on input 0. We cannot decide this question relative to our canonical indexing , and normally that is taken as powerful evidence that the question is intuitively undecidable. Computation relative to  does not seem to me to yield a mechanical procedure for deciding whether partial recursive functions are defined on input 0. At the very least, classifying  as admissible would be a major revision to current mathematical practice. In a similar vein, Rogers [1987, pp. 41-42] proves that, for any notation : *  ,    iff the Enumeration theorem and Parameterization theorems are true for  (i.e. the theorems remain true when one substitutes  for ).
These 'intrinsic' characterizations of admissibility for and seem helpful. At least they avoid any appeal to an arbitrarily chosen privileged notation. However, neither characterization yields anything resembling an analysis of admissibility for the relevant domain. Neither characterization reveals why certain notations are suitable for computing over the relevant domain while others are not. Moreover, neither characterization even tries to characterize admissible notations over an arbitrary domain.
Can we provide a satisfying analysis of admissibility for arbitrary domains? Or, failing that, a satisfying analysis of admissibility for certain salient domains? For present purposes, we may leave these questions unanswered. What matters is simply that the distinction between admissible and deviant notations plays an important role within computability theory. The distinction arises whenever we model computation over a countably infinite non-linguistic domain. In certain cases (such as ), the distinction is an explicit target of mathematical study.
Multiplicity
Most domains studied within classical recursion theory support only a single fruitful notion of computability. But some countably infinite domains X satisfy Multiplicity: There exist non-equivalent notations that are both admissible for computation over X. These distinct notations yield distinct yet equally legitimate notions of Turing computation over X.
A good example is computation over finite subsets of [Rogers, 1987, pp. 69-71] . There are at least three admissible ways of naming a finite A  : Grzegorczyk [1955] , Hauck [1973] , Lacombe [1955] , and others. Weihrauch introduces 7 d base-2 is non-injective, since every dyadic rational number has two names: one name terminates with infinitely many '0's, and the other name terminates with infinitely many '1's. Turing seems to have envisioned a slightly modified notation that includes only names of the first kind, so that each dyadic rational number has a unique name. See Gherardi [2011] for detailed analysis of Turing's approach to computable analysis. 8 Weihrauch uses the term 'notation' for surjective d: *  X with X countable and the term 'representation' for surjective d:  ω  X with X uncountable. I use the term 'notation' for both kinds of mapping.
Turing-style machines that respond to infinite strings on a read-only input tape by progressively writing infinite strings onto a write-only output tape. He defines:
f:  is computable relative to d iff there exists a machine T such that, when supplied with a d-name for xdom(f) on the input tape, T progressively writes a d-name for f (x) onto the output tape.
Intuitively: T can compute any finite initial portion of a d-name for f(x), given a sufficiently long finite initial portion of a d-name for xdom(f). Developing these ideas rigorously requires various technicalities that need not concern us. The important point is that computable analysis offers a rigorously defined notion of Turing computability relative to d for functions over .
One can also rigorously define reducibility  over notations d:  ω  and e:  ω  , similar to reducibility over notations for countable domains. Intuitively: de iff some machine computes any finite initial portion of an e-name for z , given a sufficiently long finite initial portion of a d-name for z. As Turing in effect observed,
Computable analysis studies computational properties of notations d:  ω  . For example, addition is not Turing-computable relative to d base-10 . To illustrate, suppose that the input base-10 names are '1.444…' and '1.555…' The sum has two base-10 names: '2.999…' and '3.000…'. One cannot determine from any finite initial portion of the input names that a corresponding output name should begin '2', since any finite initial portion is consistent with the sum being > 3. Nor can one determine from any finite initial portion of the input names that the output name should begin '3', since any finite initial portion is consistent with the denotation being < 3. Thus, no Turing-style machine can compute even the first digit of a d base-10 -name for x+y, given arbitrary finite initial portions of d base-10 -names for x and y.
In contrast, many familiar functions (e.g. addition, multiplication, exponentiation, trigonometric functions) are computable relative to d interval . In fact, d interval is the unique notation (up to equivalence) that makes certain basic operations over computable [Hertling, 1999] . On the other hand, d interval also has some disadvantages. Notably, the step function
is not computable relative to d interval , since no finite set of open rational intervals containing x = 0 determines whether step(x) should assume value 0 or 1. But step becomes computable if one represents outputs using d > -names rather than d interval -names.
As these examples illustrate, Multiplicity pervades computable analysis. There are many non-equivalent notations for , inducing distinct notions of computation over . It seems pointless to debate which notation yields 'true' computability over the reals. A notation may be more useful for certain mathematical purposes, but no one notation seems uniquely qualified above the others to deserve exclusive status. We may instructively compare computability theory with other developed branches of mathematics, such as number theory, analysis, set theory, algebra, and topology. Those fields study a fixed mathematical structure (such as the natural numbers or the real numbers) or collection of mathematical structures (such as structures satisfying the axioms of a group or a topological space). One studies mathematical structures in themselves, without studying our representational access to those structures. Of course, one must represent a structure in order to study it. But number theory, algebra, analysis, topology, and set theory do not explicitly address our representational interface with the relevant structures. For example, number theory studies the natural numbers, without explicitly considering how we represent natural numbers. In contrast, computability theory studies human and machine computation over mathematical structures. This subject matter ensures a essential role for the representational interface between humans (or machines) and salient mathematical structures. Representation becomes an object of explicit study, in a way that it does not for most branches of mathematics. 
Previous philosophical treatments of computation and representation
The string-theoretic reinterpretation strategy
One might hope to construe recursion theory as concerned solely with computable functions over *. What would we lose by studying string-theoretic functions : *  * rather than numerical functions f:  ? Why bother studying computation over numbers when we can instead study computation over numerals? More generally, one might hope to construe the mathematical study of computability in non-semantic terms. Why not concentrate entirely on string manipulation, considered in detachment from any semantic interpretation of strings? In short, why not simply confine ourselves to computability theory in the narrow sense?
Let us call this approach the string-theoretic reinterpretation strategy. Note that the strategy is revisionary regarding mainstream mathematical practice. Since the 1930s, recursion theorists have studied computability over natural numbers in addition to computability over strings. Thus, the string-theoretic reinterpretation strategy jettisons a fundamental, longstanding commitment of mathematical research into computability [Rescorla, 2007] .
Even if we were to replace computation over numbers with computation over strings, the string-theoretic reinterpretation strategy would be untenable for recursion theory as a whole. 
Formal apparatus versus intuitive grounding
Readers may protest that we can formulate the definitions and theorems of computability theory As many authors have stressed [Gödel, 1972 [Gödel, /1990 Rogers, 1987, pp. 1-20; Soare, 1996] , computability theory is fundamentally concerned with intuitive notions of computation over various structures, including , , and so on. What makes the formal theory so important are its links to our intuitive notions. As Kripke puts it: 'independently of any idea of intuitive computability, one can state the formal definitions of the theory… However, without the idea of intuitive computability, the entire motivation of the theory would be lost ' [2011, p. 344] . Even though one can state computability theory's formal definitions and theorems without mentioning intuitive computability, one fully understands the significance of these definitions and theorems only when one relates them to intuitive computability.
Classical recursion theory provides a clear illustration. We begin with an intuitive concept (computable number-theoretic function), and we then isolate a corresponding formal definition (partial recursive function). Church's thesis asserts that the intuitive concept and the
formal definition are extensionally equivalent. The formal definition commands so much interest precisely due to this putative extensional equivalence. When we prove a theorem involving the formal definition, we feel confident that our theorem illuminates intuitive computability over .
The links between intuitive concepts and formal definitions are less straightforward but no less important for other domains. For example, we have not one but numerous intuitive notions of computation over , corresponding to non-equivalent notations for real numbers.
Computable analysis elucidates these informal notions through formal definitions. It reveals that certain informal notions (e.g. computability relative to base-10 notation) are not as mathematically fruitful as we might have hoped, thereby leading us to prioritize others (e.g.
computability relative to rational open interval notation).
Thus, the relations between formal apparatus and informal grounding are typically more dynamic than the special case of might suggest. What matters at present is that those relations are fundamental to computability theory.
The field's definitions and theorems merit such intense interest because they purportedly explicate, refine, or illuminate various intuitive notions of computability. Absent such ties to our intuitive notions, the definitions and theorems would articulate a formal mathematical structure lacking the profound significance that computability theory in fact enjoys.
Representational concepts play a key role in connecting formal mathematical theorizing To illustrate the crucial importance of representation, consider the Totality Problem.
There is no Turing machine T such that
Given input x, T outputs 1 if  x is total and 0 if  x is not total, where : *  is our canonical notation for partial recursive functions. We can state and prove this theorem without deploying intuitive notions of computation or representation. But the theorem is so significant only because it illuminates an intuitive notion of computation over the partial recursive functions. Based on the theorem, we conclude that the Totality Problem is 'undecidable,' i.e. there is no mechanical procedure for deciding whether a partial recursive function is total. Our conclusion involves the pre-theoretic notion of mechanical procedure. It reflects our conviction that  is a good formal proxy for all representational schemes one might legitimately employ when computing over partial recursive functions. We presume that any admissible notation for is computably intertranslatable with . Only given this presumption does the formal theorem entail that the Totality Problem is 'undecidable.'
The interconnections between formal apparatus, intuitive computability, and representation become particularly salient when Multiplicity prevails. 
Worries about mathematical representation
Philosophers have extensively debated how we are able to represent mathematical entities and even whether we succeed in doing so. I want to clarify my analysis of computability theory by briefly engaging with these debates.
Modern mathematics routinely postulates numbers, functions, sets, and other mathematical entities. At first blush, anyone who accepts modern mathematics is committed to the existence of these entities. Some philosophers disagree. They recommend that we interpret (or reinterpret) mathematical discourse in nominalist terms that avoid all apparent reference to mathematical entities. As many critics have noted, it is unclear whether one can develop a satisfying nominalist construal of mathematical discourse. In any case, I assume the existence of natural numbers, real numbers, partial recursive functions, etc.
Some philosophers grant the existence of mathematical entities while denying that we achieve determinate reference to them. Skolem [1922 Skolem [ /1967 . Putnam [1980] espouses model-theoretic skepticism regarding set theory. In certain passages [1979, p. 22; 1981, p. 67 ], he appears to espouse model-theoretic skepticism regarding arithmetic.
Model-theoretic skepticism may seem to endanger my analysis of computability theory. I have claimed that computability theorists study computation over the natural numbers, the real numbers, and other mathematical structures. But what makes it the case that one is computing over the 'intended' structure, rather than a non-isomorphic structure? Perhaps mathematical practice does not fix any determinate structure as the one over which a human or machine computes. For example, what ensures that some Turing machine is computing over the standard natural numbers? One might worry that we can just as well reinterpret recursion theory as concerning Turing-computation over a non-isomorphic model [Araújo and Carnielli, 2012; Dean, 2014] .
I think that we may safely dismiss such worries. Existing arguments for model-theoretic skepticism are unconvincing [Bays, 2001] . Most such arguments assume a premise along the following lines:
The only constraint on a good interpretation of mathematical discourse is that it make certain sentences true.
This premise, coupled with the existence of non-standard models, entails that one cannot 'latch onto' a determinate interpretation. Fortunately, we need not grant the premise [Lewis, 1984] . We need not concede that good interpretation of mathematical discourse is constrained only by the requirement that certain sentences come out true. Many additional factors may constrain good interpretation of mathematical discourse, including mathematical factors [Gaifman, 2004; Halbach and Horsten, 2005] , physical factors [Field, 2001, pp. 332-360] , cognitive factors [Peacocke, 1998] , and communicative factors [Parsons, 2008, pp. 279-293] . For all the modeltheoretic skeptic has argued, such factors may help privilege a determinate interpretation.
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I therefore assume that model-theoretic skepticism is mistaken. I assume that arithmetic concerns a unique structure (up to isomorphism). Similarly for real analysis. This paper is directed towards readers who share my assumptions. Given my assumptions, we may safely assume that humans and machines compute over determinate structures, including the natural numbers and the real numbers. Computability theory studies these computations, along with representational relations that make the computations possible.
Even if one rejects model-theoretic skepticism, pressing questions remain concerning our ability to represent determinate mathematical structures. How do we 'latch onto' the standard model of arithmetic or analysis, rather than some non-standard model? If first-order arithmetical truth does not fix a unique interpretation for arithmetical discourse, then what does? Such questions are especially puzzling in light of the fact, emphasized by Benacerraf [1973] , that causal interaction with mathematical entities seems impossible. The questions merit thorough investigation. But I think we should investigate them under the working assumption that modeltheoretic skepticism is false. Moreover, one need not answer these questions in order to conduct fruitful philosophical inquiry premised on the falsity of model-theoretic skepticism.
Recently, some writers have suggested that computational considerations can illuminate reference to the natural numbers [Halbach and Horsten, 2005; Horsten, 2012] . They cite Tennenbaum's theorem that non-standard models of arithmetic render addition non-recursive.
They conclude that the standard model is privileged over non-isomorphic models. Sometimes the goal behind this computationalist agenda is to rebut model-theoretic skepticism about arithmetic.
Sometimes the goal is more modest: to illuminate mathematical reference under the assumption that model-theoretic skepticism is false. Button and Smith [2012] and Dean [2014] critique the computationalist agenda. I take no stand in these debates. I do not pursue the computationalist agenda, nor do I criticize it. My topic is not whether computational considerations help select a determinate interpretation for arithmetical discourse. I simply assume that relevant mathematical vocabulary has a determinate interpretation (up to isomorphism).
COMPUTABILITY THEORY: AN INTENSIONAL ENTERPRISE
To study computation over a non-linguistic domain X, computability theorists adduce linguistic items that name elements of X. They develop a computability theory for names, and they then transfer this theory from names to objects named. Thus, the field's typical methodology is to consider computations over representations of mathematical entities. In that sense, computability theory adopts an intensional viewpoint. By an 'intensional' viewpoint, I mean one that takes into account how objects are represented.
Within classical recursion theory, we can usually discount differences among notation systems. All admissible notations over yield the same notion of computability. We can therefore develop an extensional theory of computation over , that is, a theory that ignores how natural numbers are represented [Rogers, 1987, p. 10] . When Multiplicity prevails, a purely extensional theory is not viable. We must explicitly relativize to notational systems. Even when Multiplicity does not prevail, so that a purely extensional theory becomes possible, our extensional theory rests upon an explanatorily prior theory of computation over names.
Inevitably, then, computability theory assigns explanatory priority to the intensional viewpoint over the extensional viewpoint. We cannot disentangle the study of computation over a nonlinguistic domain from the study of how one represents the domain.
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Exclusive focus on encourages neglect of computability theory's intensional aspects.
Domains where Multiplicity prevails offer a salutary corrective, reminding us that computation over a non-linguistic domain always presupposes an invidious distinction among notation systems that represent the domain.
When we study computation over a non-linguistic domain, we are studying traits that adhere in the first instance to objects as represented in suitable ways, not to objects in themselves. One computes an output as represented in a suitable way from an input as represented in a suitable way. Hence, our core subject matter mandates an intensional viewpoint.
12 Intensional aspects of computability theory are widely recognized among computer scientists and mathematicians [Abramsky, 2013; Feferman, 2013] . They receive much less attention from philosophers, Dean [2014] This mandate differentiates computability theory from most other branches of mathematics, including number theory, analysis, set theory, algebra, and topology.
'A FRANKLY INEQUALITARIAN ATTITUDE'
Let us explore the intensional aspects of computability theory by considering quantification into referentially opaque contexts.
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A referentially opaque context arises when substitution of co-referring expressions does not preserve truth-value. Propositional attitude attributions generate opaque contexts: even though Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens, one can believe that Mark Twain is famous without believing that Samuel Clemens is famous. Quine [1966; 1981] compares the sentences:
(1) Ralph believes that (x)(x is a spy).
(2) (x)(Ralph believes that x is a spy).
There is a clear intuitive difference: (1) attributes a belief that spies exist, while (2) attributes suspicion that a specific individual is a spy. Now suppose Ralph believes that (x)(x is a spy) and also believes that no two spies are the same height. He concludes that the shortest spy is a spy.
Yet (2) may be false. Apparently, then, one can infer (2) only from certain sentences of the form (3) Ralph believes that a is a spy.
(2) is true only if Ralph attributes spyhood to an individual as represented in a suitable way. In Quine's [1966, p. 184] words, quantifying into opaque contexts presupposes a 'frankly inequalitarian attitude toward the various ways of specifying' an object. 14 13 Shapiro [2000, p. 46 ] also mentions the connection with quantification into opaque contexts, although he pursues the connection from a rather different angle. 14 Kaplan [1969] attempts to articulate the requisite 'frankly inequalitarian' attitude. He proposes that the inference from (3) to (2) is licensed just in case 'a' is vivid and 'a' is a name of its denotation for Ralph. Unfortunately, Kaplan leaves the crucial vivid/non-vivid distinction fairly obscure.
Following Hintikka [1962] , Quine eventually [1981, pp. 120-122] decides that the inference from (3) to (2) is licensed only when Ralph knows which entity 'a' designates. Quine argues that the notion knowing which is highly interest-relative. He concludes that the difference between (1) and (2), which initially seems so sharp, is distressingly context-sensitive. He despairs of finding any systematic criterion that dictates when (2) is true. Detecting no firm scientific basis for the 'frankly inequalitarian' attitude presupposed by (2), he recommends that we purge (2) and kindred locutions from rigorous scientific theorizing.
Kripke deploys computability theory to rebut Quine. Restricting attention to computation over , Kripke writes [2011, p. 261] :
A computable function is a function f such that for each given n, if you put in a particular Kripke's example is a special case of the general phenomenon discussed in Section 2.2. If we define a notation d f : *  that maps n to the nth element in the sequence: Kripke might reply that in some sense one 'knows which' value is at issue even from a very long Arabic decimal numeral or a  base-10 name. Perhaps so. Overall, though, I think it more fruitful to formulate Kripke's anti-Quinean perspective without relying upon the 'know which' locution. I now attempt to do so.
Opacity and computability
Intuitively, a mechanical procedure P computes function f just in case P yields the correct output f(x) given any input x. In this spirit, Soare describes an algorithm for computing f as 'a finite set of instructions which, given an input x, yields after a finite number of steps an output y = f(x)' [1987, p. 8] . More formally, we may write:
(4) Mechanical procedure P computes function f iff (x)(y)( f(x) = y  P yields output y on input x).
15
As Kripke's discussion highlights, we must interpret (4) carefully so as to avoid trivializing the notion of computability. For any total numerical function f, there is a mechanical procedure P f such that, for all n,
namely, the procedure that replaces an input numeral 'n' with output symbol 'f(n)'. P f yields a unique output for each input, so we have
Applying Leibniz's law to (5), we infer
From (4), (6), and (7), we infer that P f computes f. Since f is an arbitrary total numerical function, we have collapsed the distinction between computability and non-computability.
How can we avoid this disastrous result? Intuitively, the reason why P f does not compute f is that P f represents f's output using the unsuitable term 'f(n)'. A procedure that computes f must represent inputs and outputs using a suitable canonical notation. If we want to preserve (4) while honoring these intuitions, then the most promising strategy is to regard the y position in (8) P yields output y on input x 15 My formulation expresses an intuitive analogue to strong computability (see note 5). as opaque. We can then say that f(n) = m while denying that
where 'm' is a numeral in a canonical notation system (e.g. Arabic decimal notation). Perhaps there is also a reading on which (8) is transparent rather than opaque. On that putative reading, (9) is true. But no such reading is relevant to computability theory. Instead, we require a reading on which (9) is false. We must construe (8) as an intensional transitive, akin to locutions such as 'admires,' 'seeks,' and so on. Just as there is a natural reading on which it may be that Ralph admires Mark Twain.
Ralph does not admire Samuel Clemens.
Mark Twain = Samuel Clemens.
so our desired reading supports
Since substitution of co-referring terms does not preserve truth-value, the inference from (5) to (7) is blocked. 16 We thereby preserve a robust distinction between computability and noncomputability. The price we pay is quantifying into an opaque context.
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The quantifier in (4) is universal, not existential. For an example involving existential quantification, consider: 16 We can likewise say that, even though (5) is true, the open sentence 'P f yields output y on input x' is not true under a variable assignment that assigns n to 'x' and f(n) ( = m) to 'y'. Standard Tarskian semantics then entails that '(x)(y)( f(x) = y  P f yields output y on input x)' is not true. 17 One might propose that 'yields' is a disguised quotational device, so that a more proper rendering of P yields output m on input n would be P yields output 'm' on input 'n', or perhaps P yields output 'm' with denotation m on input 'n' with denotation n. According to this proposal, (4) quantifies into quotation marks. Since quantification into quotation marks does not seem intelligible, the proposal impugns (4)'s intelligibility. I respond that, although there may be a reading on which 'yields' involves disguised quotation, there is also a reading on which it does not. For example, there is a reading on which P yields output 15 on input 39 is true even though P operates over binary numerals rather than base-10 numerals. By adopting such a reading, we can make good sense of (4).
(10) Ralph uses mechanical procedure P to compute f's value on input n.
Statements of this kind figure prominently in the pre-theoretic discourse that gives rise to computability theory. We may naturally regiment (10) as (11) (y)(Ralph uses mechanical procedure P to compute that f has output y on input n).
Perhaps there is a reading on which (11) is true no matter how Ralph represents f's output. On this putative reading, Ralph uses mechanical procedure P f to compute that f assumes output f(n) on input n.
entails
Ralph uses mechanical procedure P f to compute f's value on input n.
No such reading is relevant to computability theory. Instead, we require a reading on which (11) is true if Ralph represents f's output using an admissible notation (e.g. binary notation) but false if Ralph represents f's output using a deviant notation (e.g. d f ). On the requisite reading, there is a huge difference between (11) and (12) Ralph uses mechanical procedure P to compute that (y)( f has output y on input n).
(12) attributes a generic realization that f attains some output on input n, while (11) attributes a suitable grasp of the specific numerical output. Quine might regard the distinction between (11) and (12) as too context-sensitive or interest-relative for serious scientific purposes. Nevertheless, a distinction along those lines underlies computability theory.
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The opacity in (4) and (11) 
Intensional aspects of computability theory
When elucidating basic aspects of computability, we find ourselves drawn to the linguistic device castigated by Quine: quantification into an opaque context. Admittedly, one can state computability theory's formal definitions and theorems without employing locutions such as (4) or (11). However, as I argued in Section 3.3, fully understanding the formal definitions and theorems requires that we relate them to our pre-theoretic conception of computation. (4), (11), and kindred locutions naturally arise when we articulate how the formal theory bears upon our intuitive conception. Evidently, Quine overlooked the extent to which mathematical science embraces the intensional phenomena he deemed so problematic.
We can avoid quantifying into opaque contexts by introducing a quantifier over names.
We can define mechanical procedure P computes function f relative to notation d, and we can say that f is computable iff some mechanical procedure computes f relative to an admissible notation. This alternative procedure only accentuates the need for distinguishing between admissible and deviant notations. We can honor the distinction either implicitly (by quantifying into an opaque context) or explicitly (by overtly privileging certain notations over others). Either way, we adopt a 'frankly inequalitarian attitude toward the various ways of specifying' objects in the domain of computation. Such an attitude is needed to preserve the distinction between computable and non-computable functions.
To illustrate, suppose we want to say that some total number-theoretic function f is not intuitively computable. We do not capture this fact in full generality if we only mention a single privileged notation for , because some mechanical procedures operate relative to other admissible notations. To attain a suitably general formulation, we might say:
(13) There is no mechanical procedure P and no admissible notation d for the natural numbers such that (x)(y)( f(d(x)) = d(y)  P yields output y on input x), where quantifiers range over numerals. Alternatively, we might avoid explicit talk of notations:
(14) There is no mechanical procedure P such that (x)(y)( f(x) = y  P yields output y on input x), where quantifiers range over natural numbers. As I have argued, (14) comes out true only if we construe it as quantifying into an opaque context. Whether we choose (13) or (14), we draw an invidious distinction between notations. We do so either explicitly (by overtly mentioning admissibility) or implicitly (by quantifying into an opaque context). Either way, we must consider how natural numbers are represented. When expressing with full generality that f is not intuitively computable, we find ourselves adopting an intensional viewpoint.
Some readers may worry that formulations such as (13) and (14) veer dangerously close to vicious circularity. My formulations rely, either explicitly or implicitly, upon an unexplicated notion of 'admissible notation.' It may therefore seem that I am assuming some unexplicated notion of computability for notation systems. Assuming such a notion would surely be
illegitimate when we are trying analyze numerical computability in non-circular terms.
I reply that I am not trying to analyze numerical computability in non-circular terms. In fact, I have argued elsewhere that there is no evident way to provide a non-circular conceptual analysis of numerical computability, precisely because we do not know how to analyze the notion 'admissible notation' in satisfying non-circular terms [Rescorla, 2007] . I do not advance (13) and (14) as contributions to a non-circular analysis of computability. I advance them as theoretically central and extensionally correct statements about computability. That we find ourselves assigning a central role to such locutions demonstrates the ineliminably intensional nature of computability theory.
CONCLUSION
Computability theory offers a rigorous study of the interplay between ways of representing a domain and finite mechanical operations over that domain. It embeds reciprocal explanatory relations between computation and representation: we need representational notions to understand computation over non-linguistic domains; and computational tools illuminate key properties of representational systems. By further exploring these reciprocal explanatory relations, we may hope to gain substantial insight into representation as well as computation. Just as philosophical reflection upon set theory has illuminated fundamental ontological and epistemological questions surrounding abstract entities, philosophical reflection upon computability theory can illuminate fundamental questions surrounding representation and intensionality. We have only begun to mine computability theory for its philosophical payoff.
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